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D‘. ELAINE FAHEY ͚INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE ACTORS OF POST-NATIONAL RULE-
MAKING͛ IN THE ACTORS OF POSTNATIONAL RULE-MAKING: CONTEMPORARY 
CHALLENGES OF EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW EDITED BY ELAINE FAHEY 
(ROUTLEDGE – 2015) 
Dr. Elaine Fahey 
Introduction: Framing the Actors of Post-National Rule-Making 
 
This publication has its origins in a workshop held in Amsterdam organised by the ͚Architecture of 
Postnational Rule-Making͛ research project at the University of Amsterdam, devoted to dissecting 
new means and forms of actors engaging in rule-making beyond the Nation State. While there may 
be vast legal literature devoted to dissecting functional actors, courts and forms of private actors 
and legislative or executive power, legal scholarship rarely hones in on the precise idea of an actor in 
rule-making. Arguably this publication takes an even narrower cut of the theme and selects 
predominantly- but not exclusively- two subject areas as its focus, which are European Union (EU) 
law and Public International law as manifestations of postnational rule-making. EU and PIL arguably 
constitute the leading contemporary sources of study for postnational rule-making and for this 
reason are worthy subjects. However, this is not to suggest that it is the only or optimum take on 
postnational rule-making. Part of the difficulty targeted by this publication is that irrespective of the 
subject area, many of the most significant actors engaging in rule-making in contemporary times are 
Ŷot teĐhŶiĐallǇ ͚aĐtoƌs͛ iŶ stƌiĐt legal teƌŵs. The publication thus focusses upon certain ͚blind spots͛ 
in our understanding of actors in rule-making, that impact upon and even shape our analysis of 
conduct and the reasons for their status quo as blind spots. In order to further narrow the terms of 
the contribution, its focus is in large measure upon the analysis of practices of rule-making, specific 
behaviour and action taking place in what might be termed ͚in the shadows͛ of other institutional 
components. Postnational rule-making is a term which may capture a vast range of rule-making 
beyond the Nation State. It may capture EU and Public International law in their entirety. As living 
sciences such subjects appear often highly flexible and innovative. And while postnational rule-
making poses challenges for understanding the place of the nation State it also affords a useful 
tabula rasa. The tabula rasa of postnational rule-making must be approached by the user with 
caution. In this regard, part of the challenge of postnational rule-making maybe empirical as much as 
metaphysical, i.e. as to what it is and what is could and should be are equally challenging.  
                                                                 Dr. Elaine Fahey, Senior Lecturer, the City Law School. City University London. Elaine.fahey.1@city.ac.uk.  
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I. On ͚postnational͛ rule-making 
(i) An overview 
 
A ͚ĐoŶstellatioŶ͛ is the infamous and commonly-used construct of ͚postnational͛ rule-making, 
embracing all transnational law and theory. It is often used to depict in all-embracing terms its 
components, by way of a term which specifically captures its spatial and theoretical complexity.1 The 
lexicon of the ͚spatial͛ is not unique to the transnational.2 The appeal of spatial metaphors explains 
from assertions of its usefulness as to its methodological components.3 Yet for all of its spatial 
associations, such a constellation encompasses a conglomeration of institutions, transnational and 
supranational organisations, private economic power, and, of course, the Nation State.4 The vastness 
of the number of actors within this context may readily cause us to lose sharp focus. Moreover, the 
͚direction͛ of oŶe͛s focus upon actors may be methodologically dominant.5  For example, private 
economic power has tended to form the subject and object of much contemporary analysis, but in a 
͚unidirectional͛ fashion.6 And newer actors and configurations of actors may attract more attention, 
than existing institutional entities or international organisations.  
What this publication focusses upon is how the postnational ͚constellation͛ comprises many active 
and ͚liǀiŶg͛ iŶstitutioŶal ĐoŵpoŶeŶts. Institutional and specific forms of international law have 
traditionally been enacted so as to provide information for political actors in decision-making 
process, to provide certainty for the global legal order and to constrain, develop and evolve global 
politics. The goals of such changes have been shown to be easily overtaken over time, by time itself, 
power, politics and many other internal and external criteria. The postnational constellation 
inherently comprises active and living entities acting beyond the control of political processes or 
organised institutional design. There is an organic quality to it that is both challenging but also 
explanatory thereof. As a landscape, it operates within an uneasy actor-causative dynamic-: has it 
                                                                
1 P. )uŵďaŶseŶ, ͚TƌaŶsŶatioŶal Laǁ, EǀolǀiŶg͛ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 27/2011 accessed 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975403>.  
2 ͚PuďliĐ adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͛ is siŵilaƌlǇ a spaĐe of pƌolifeƌatiŶg aĐtoƌs, a proliferation that comes in waves of 
developments at national and international level - see D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union: Law, 
Practices and the Living Constitution (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
3 Zumbansen, (n 1), see D. Chalŵeƌs, ͚Post-natioŶalisŵ aŶd the Ƌuest foƌ ĐoŶstitutioŶal suďstitutes͛ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ Ϯϳ 
Journal of Law and Society 178. 
4 A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, ͚‘egiŵe-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation 
of Global Laǁ͛ (2004) 25(4) Michigan Journal of International Law pp. 999-1046.  
5 K. Abbott and D. Snidal, ͚International Regulation without International Government: Improving International 
OƌgaŶizatioŶ PeƌfoƌŵaŶĐe Thƌough OƌĐhestƌatioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ϱ The Review of International Organizations pp 315-
344.  
6 Ibid. 
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resulted in the need for or more so the significance of more actors in the rule-making space.7 Least 
of all, it has not particularized our focus upon its components. 
 
(ii) On Postnational Rule-Making and its lexicon 
 
The teƌŵs suĐh as ͚postŶatioŶal constitutionalism͛ oƌ ͚postŶatioŶal deŵoĐƌaĐǇ͛ haǀe ďeeŶ deploǇed 
to depiĐt ͚the state of the “tate͛ as ŵuĐh as the decline of the boundaries of societal orthodoxy.8 Yet 
theƌe is Ŷo aĐĐepted Ŷoƌŵatiǀe idea of postŶatioŶal ͚laǁ͛. At its height, the deploǇŵeŶt of the teƌŵ 
postŶatioŶal iŶ legal sĐholaƌship has ďeeŶ ĐƌitiƋued as ďeiŶg ďoth ͚EU-ĐeŶtƌiĐ͛ aŶd ͚Couƌt-ĐeŶtƌiĐ͛. It 
has been dismissed as lacking relevance to any legal order or field outside of the context of the EU, 
constructed largely through judicialised understandings of conduct that may not be readily 
transposed elsewhere. Fundamentally, the postnational is perceived not to have a broad reach, 
precisely because, as has been wryly remarked, ͚ǁe haǀe Ǉet to aƌƌiǀe at a post-ŶatioŶal ǁoƌld͛.9 
Nonetheless, its context and lexicon indicates that the performance of constitutionalism and politics 
is no longer configured around or constructed within the territorial strictures of the Nation State. It 
signifies the importance of the proliferation of new forms of law and politics, interactions between 
legal orders and political disordering.10  The studǇ of the ͚postnational͛ is arguably less a study of 
single or specific actors, instruments or policies and instead is probably more accurately a broader 
methodology to study shifts in actors, norms and processes.11  
Whatever about its over-arching ͚leǆiĐoŶ͛,12 postnational rule-making as a process is more intrusive 
than ever, taking place under public scrutiny, around or alongside the increasing openness of a 
                                                                
7 B. Kohler-Koch and C. Quittkat, ͚De-Mystification of Participatory Democracy: EU-Governance and Civil 
SoĐietǇ͛ (Oxford: OUP, 2013).  
8 K. Ladeur, ͚The Theory of Autopoiesis as an Approach to a Better Understanding of Postmodern Law - From 
the Hierarchy of Norms to the Heterarchy of Changing Patterns of Legal Inter-relationships͛ ;ϭϵϵϵͿ Law No. 
99/3, EUI Working Papers European University Institute, Law Department; E. Eriksen, C. Joerges and F. Rödl 
(eds.),  ͚Law, Democracy and Solidarity in a Post-national Union: the Unsettled Political Order of Europe – 
Routledge “tudies oŶ DeŵoĐƌatisiŶg Euƌope͛ (Oxford: Routledge, 2008); E. Eriksen, C. Joerges and F. Rödl 
(eds.), ͚Laǁ aŶd DeŵoĐƌaĐǇ iŶ the Post-NatioŶal UŶioŶ͛ (2006) Arena/European University Institute Arena 
Report  1/2006,  ; N. Walkeƌ, ͚PostŶatioŶal CoŶstitutioŶalisŵ aŶd PostŶatioŶal PuďliĐ Laǁ: A Tale of Tǁo 
Neologisŵs͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ ϯ Transnational Legal Theory pp. 61-86. 
9 G. “haffeƌ, ͚A TƌaŶsŶatioŶal Take oŶ KƌisĐh's Pluƌalist “tƌuĐtuƌe of PostŶatioŶal Laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ Ϯϯ European 
Journal of International Law pp. 565-582, 582; N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of 
Postnational Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011). 
10 See Chalmers, (n 3). 
11 R. Urueña, No Citizens Here: Global Subjects and Participation in International Law (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). 
12 ͚The ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ of a peƌsoŶ, laŶguage, oƌ ďƌaŶĐh of kŶoǁledge͛ accessed 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/lexicon> 
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digitally-connected global society.13  It is a change that is said to reflect the shifting empirical 
landscape of the exercise of authority beyond the Nation State.14 The actors of this context may be 
said to have become more easily visible and more responsive to this scrutiny in recent times, in the 
era of transparency and public protests for accountability.15 This leads to a consideration of the 
empirics of actors engaging in rule-making beyond the Nation State, as to, inter alia, what we 
measure and how we understand such measurement. 
(iii) The empirics of what we speak about beyond the Nation State 
 
From an empirical perspective, our understanding of the ͚postnational͛ oƌ its constellation remains 
limited, variable and even haphazard. Despite the evolved state of transnational law as an 
established subject,16 with its own communities, literature, esoteric publications across subject 
fields, theƌe aƌe ĐoŵpaƌatiǀelǇ feǁ ͚agƌeed͛ data sets, dataďases oƌ agƌeed eŵpiƌiĐal souƌĐes used ďǇ 
lawyers as to the basis of our understanding of the operation of the subject.17 The rising incidence of 
the delegation by Member States of authority to international organisations, the rising number of 
international organisations, the exponential rise of transnational non-governmental organisations 
;NGO͛sͿ aŶd the iŶĐƌease of ŵajoƌitǇ-voting in international organisations provide important 
empirical examples.18 The number of transnational entities exercising political influence has 
increased considerably, from international courts and tribunals to rating agencies, accounting 
standards and education setting bodies.19 Allied to this is the so-Đalled deǀelopŵeŶt of ͚juƌistoĐƌaĐǇ͛, 
                                                                
13 See, for example,  MiĐhael )üƌŶ ͚The politiĐizatioŶ of ǁoƌld politiĐs aŶd its effeĐts: Eight pƌopositioŶs͛ (2014) 
6(1) European Political Science Review, 47-71.   
14 Ibid. 
15 See, for example, the evolution of the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations and the place of transparency therein or the evolution of ICANN rule-making and its gradual 
openness for and to the world.  
16 Which arguably has a much broader reach than postnational rule-making but may be considered 
synonymous to a large degree.  
17 “ee B. KoƌeŵeŶos, ͚The CoŶtiŶeŶt of IŶteƌŶatioŶal Laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ Journal of Conflict Resolution pp. 1-29. 
18 See, Zürn (n 13). See also M. Herdegen Principles of International Economic Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014) at p 29 
where he notes how according to the Union of International Associations in 1909 the number of IGOS 
amounted to 37 while in 1999 this number had increased to over 3637 see 
<www.uia.org/statistics/organiszations/ytb299/php>. See Yearbook of International Organizations (BRILL, 
Hague), listing 1,200 new organizations annually. It registers 64000 transnational civil society organisations 
generally. The number of intergovernmental organisations listed in the Yearbook of International 
Organisations for 2013-2014 is 7710, a dramatic rise from the 123 recorded in 1951, (Leiden, Brill: 2013) 
KaŶetake, ϮϬϭϰ; see the ͚CoŶtiŶeŶt of iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ͛ pƌojeĐt accessed < 
http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/coil/>; the Authority of International Institutions, Transaccess accessed < 
http://www.statsvet.su.se/english/research/research-projects/transaccess>; PICT-PICT Project on 
international courts and tribunals accessed <www.pict.picti.org>; M. Zürn (n 13), L. Hooghe and G. Marks, 
͚DelegatioŶ aŶd PooliŶg iŶ IŶteƌŶatioŶal OƌgaŶizatioŶs͛ ;ϮϬϭϰ, FoƌthĐoŵiŶgͿ iŶ Review of International 
Organizations. 
19 See Zürn (n 13).  
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meaning the proliferation and the empowerment of international courts and reflections on how the 
epistemic authority of transnational and international bodies and their rising and measurable 
influence.20 The prominence of international bodies and courts within these disparate but unifying 
developments is apparent.21 This has perhaps incited many to reflect on new metrics of global 
governance emerging, for example, indicators from technologies,22 ǁhile oldeƌ ŵetƌiĐs ;͚haƌd͛ 
numbers) become part of a historical-sounding accouŶt of ͚pƌolifeƌatioŶ͛.23 One may pose the 
ƋuestioŶ as to ǁhetheƌ suffiĐieŶt eŵpiƌiĐal oƌ ĐoŶĐeptual ĐlaƌitǇ ŵaǇ ďe ďƌought to ďeaƌ upoŶ ͚the 
ǁhole͛ aŶd the suŵ of the paƌts togetheƌ as oŶe eŶteƌpƌise iŶ the ĐuƌƌeŶt status Ƌuo, aŶd 
constitutes the context for the current contribution. 
An empirical account of the circles of influence surrounding such rule-making practices:- i.e. those 
such as private associations, private economic power, lobbyists and experts including academics, 
who initiate, bolster, support or sustain rule-making, arguably remains on the margins of our 
knowledge. It may also differ substantially between legal orders and legal cultures.  The 
͚supeƌstƌuĐtuƌe͛ of postŶatioŶal ƌule-making may cause us concern because sometimes its 
components maǇ seeŵ ŵoƌe sigŶifiĐaŶt thaŶ the ͚suŵ of its paƌts͛. Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, its aĐtoƌs Đoŵpƌise 
poǁeƌful aŶd iŶdepeŶdeŶt judiĐiaƌies, Ŷeǁ ŵaŶifestatioŶs of ͚eǆeĐutiǀe͛ aĐtoƌs afteƌ the “tate oƌ 
transnational parliamentarianism. They may all be broadly understood as entities engaged in 
autonomous rule-making, to whatever degree.24 Such institutional components of organisations 
exercising public authority after the State, constitute the institutionalized phenomena of this 
landscape.25 These institutional components of organisations, not limited to the judiciary, may 
                                                                
20 ‘. HiƌsĐhl, ͚JuƌistoĐƌaĐǇ ǀs. TheoĐƌaĐǇ: CoŶstitutioŶal Couƌts aŶd the CoŶtaiŶŵeŶt of “aĐƌed Laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ ϭ;ϮͿ 
Middle East Law and Governance pp. 129-165; R. Mackenzie, C. Romano, P. Sands, and Y. Shany, The Manual 
on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford: OUP, 2010); see Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of 
International Courts (Oxford: OUP, 2014); B. Kingsbury and C. ‘oŵaŶo ;eds.Ϳ, ͚“Ǉŵposiuŵ oŶ PƌolifeƌatioŶ of 
IŶteƌŶatioŶal TƌiďuŶals: PieĐiŶg Togetheƌ the Puzzle͛ ;ϭϵϵϵͿ ϯϭ;ϰͿ NYU Journal of International Law and Politics.    
K. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014, forthcoming). M. Kanetake and A. Nollkaemper (eds.), The Rule of Law at the National and International 
Levels: Contestations and Deference (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming). 
21 See Alter, (n 19). 
22 See Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury, Sally Engle Merry IILJ Working Paper 2010/2 Rev (Revised August 
2011) Global Administrative Law Series Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance. 
23 B. Kingsbury and C. Romano (n 20).    
24 I.e. see R. D. Kelemen, ͚Euƌolegalisŵ aŶd DeŵoĐƌaĐǇ͛ ϱϬ;ϭͿ Journal of Common Market Studies 55-71 and R. 
D. Kelemen Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law & Regulation in the European Union  (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 2012) (on transnational courts and European courts in particular); D. Curtin, Executive Power 
of the European Union: Law, Practices and the Living Constitution (Oxford: OUP, 2009) (on the executive in the 
EU); see Walker, (n 8) on transnational parliaments. See D. JaŶčić, ͚The EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt aŶd EU-US 
relatioŶs: ƌeǀaŵpiŶg iŶstitutioŶal ĐoopeƌatioŶ?͛ iŶ E FaheǇ aŶd D. CuƌtiŶ ;eds.Ϳ, A Transatlantic Community of 
Law Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge: CUP, 2014). 
25 A. BogdaŶdǇ et al ͚GeŶeƌal PƌiŶĐiples of IŶteƌŶatioŶal PuďliĐ AuthoƌitǇ: “ketĐhiŶg a ‘eseaƌĐh Field͛ ;ϮϬϬϴͿ ϵ 
German Law Journal pp. 1909-1938, accessed < 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1048>. 
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manage to engage in rule-making practices through exhibiting inter alia influence, independence, 
autoŶoŵǇ, ĐoŶtestatioŶ aŶd aŶ ͚aĐtiǀe͛ deǀelopŵeŶt of theiƌ fuŶĐtioŶs aŶd ƌoles. “o ǁhat Đould ďe 
an optimal means or method to capture them, collectively? Nevertheless, current descriptors (and 
ŵetƌiĐsͿ of the ͚postŶatioŶal͛ ŵaǇ Ŷot giǀe us adeƋuate aŶalǇtiĐal tools to ŵeasuƌe the iŶtƌusiǀeŶess 
of contemporary rule-making nor its actors. This provides more forceful reasons to sharpen our 
analytical and normative focus as to actors.  
 
II. Actors in EU and international law: between formalism and flexibility  
(i) Overview 
 
The idea of ͚actors͛ is critical to the theorisation of power, autonomy, influence and even legitimacy 
in rule-making beyond the Nation State. However, there is no consensus in scholarship on what it 
means to be an actor, despite its centrality to discussions on rule-making, power and influence, 
across disciplines, not least in legal scholarship.26  An actor engaging in rule-making is understood in 
this account as those who adopt acts, practices and/ or standards in the exercise of legal authority. 
These challenges are felt acutely in rule-making beyond the Nation State, where the actors may 
either be fledging or evolving and where the rule-making practices may vary substantially from 
conventional practices. To view an institution as an actor in their own right is a technically rather 
inaccurate one from a legal perspective.27 This is because legal doctrine employs formal and arguably 
limiting criteria to assess ͚aĐtoƌ qualities,͛ e.g. legal personality, legal authority to act and 
institutional autonomy. These criteria are heavily rooted in the Trias Politica.28 The problem they 
pose is a circular one because such formalism may pose endless limitations. For example, one may 
consider in this light the challenges faced by those seeking to conceptualise actors in international 
laǁ as ͚paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ oƌ those aƌguiŶg foƌ a depaƌtuƌe fƌoŵ aŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of iŶteƌŶatioŶal legal 
                                                                
26 C. Hill, ͚The CapaďilitǇ-ExpectatioŶs Gap, oƌ CoŶĐeptualiziŶg Euƌope͛s IŶteƌŶatioŶal ‘ole͛ ;ϭϵϵϯͿ ϯϭ;ϯͿ Journal 
of Common Market Studies pp. 305-328; J. Jupille and J. Capoƌaso ͚“tates, AgeŶĐǇ aŶd ‘ules: the EuƌopeaŶ 
Union in Global EnǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal PolitiĐs͛ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ iŶ C. Rhodes (eds.), The European Union in the World 
Community, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 213-229); M. Barnett, M. Finnemore, Rules for the 
World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
27 While it is difficult to find clear statements to this effect, it is perhaps a self-evident proposition within 
scholarship. 
28 M. Cremona, ͚The European Union as a global actor: Roles, models and ideŶtitǇ͛ (2004) 41 Common Market 
Law Review pp. 553-573; D. Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers 
(Oxford: OUP, 2005); R. Collins and N. White (eds.), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy:  
Institutional Independence in the International Legal Order (United States: Routledge, 2011);  
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personality limited to State actors.29 Or to similar effect, one might consider in Public International 
law the complexity of the foƌŵulatioŶ of aŶ ͚iŶteƌŶatioŶal foƌeigŶ fighteƌ͛ in the UN Security Council 
Resolution or in EU law, the evolution of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a ͚legal 
aĐtoƌ͛.30 By contrast, other disciplines may appear often significantly less burdened by formalism. For 
example, emerging theories of international politics readily embraced the new phenomenon of 
secretariats of international organisations. 31 These practices cause us some difficulty in that they 
appear to open up a greater distance between law and other disciplines as to the lexicon of actors. 
To put the issue differently, one may ask how malleable should legal principles be for each new actor 
as part of a system and/ or organisation? For example, the autonomous ͚arrangements͛ in 
multilateral environmental agreements adverted to above have been accorded their own lexicon 
and are now the working language of International environmental law.32 This in turn raises the 
question as to appropriate flexibility and pragmatism of legal theory as to actors. It has been argued 
that to construe public international law in overly simplified terms of ͚subjects͛ and ͚objects͛ would 
subject it to a form of intellectual prison.33 Instead, many call for more elaborate conceptual tools to 
systematize the lexicon of non-state actors and their role played in contemporary international 
law.34 Yet whether the solution lies in relativizing the subjects or subjectivising the actors remains for 
some time open to doubt.35  
 
                                                                
29 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: OUP, 1994); C. Walter, 
͚Subjects of International Law͛ (2007) in R. Wolfrum et al (eds.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012) Vol 9 pp. 634ff; A. Bianchi, Non-State Actors and International Law 
(London: Ashgate Publishing 2009); S. Woolcock, ͚State and Non-State Actors͛ in S. Woolcock and N Bayne 
(eds.), The New Economic Diplomacy (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2nd ed, 2007); R Hofmann, Non-State Actors 
as New Subjects of International Law - from the Traditional State Order towards the Law of Global Community 
(Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2000). 
30 UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters S/RES/2187 (2014) (24 September 2014); 
see also <http://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2178-2014-the-foreign-terrorist-fighter-as-an-
international-legal-person-part-i/> ;  <http://www.ejiltalk.org/un-security-council-adopts-resolution-2178-on-
foreign-terrorist-fighters/>; M. Gatti, ͚Diploŵats at the Baƌ: the EuƌopeaŶ EǆteƌŶal AĐtioŶ “eƌǀiĐe ďefoƌe the 
EU Đouƌts͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ϯϵ;ϱͿ European Law Review 664. 
31 M. BaƌŶett aŶd M. FiŶŶeŵoƌe, ͚The PolitiĐs, Poǁeƌ, aŶd Pathologies of IŶteƌŶatioŶal OƌgaŶizatioŶs͛ ;ϭϵϵϵͿ ϱϯ 
International Organizations pp. 699-732. 
32E.g. involving a conference or meeting of parties with decision making powers, a secretariat and specialist 
subsidiary bodies; see R. Churchill and G. UlfsteiŶ, ͚AutoŶoŵous IŶstitutioŶal AƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts iŶ Multilateƌal 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-NotiĐed PheŶoŵeŶoŶ iŶ IŶteƌŶatioŶal Laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ ϵϰ;ϰͿ American Journal 
of International Law pp. 623-659; F. Biermann and B. Siebenhüner (eds.), Managers of Global Change: The 
Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2009). 
33 See Higgins, (n 29). 
34 S. WoolĐoĐk, ͚“tate aŶd NoŶ-“tate AĐtoƌs͛ iŶ “ WoolĐoĐk aŶd N BaǇŶe (eds.), The New Economic Diplomacy  
(London: Ashgate Publishing, 2nd ed., 2007); R Hofmann and N. Geissler (eds.), Non-State Actors as New 
Subjects of International Law - from the Traditional State Order towards the law of Global Community (Berlin: 
Duncker and Humblot, 1999); see Bianchi (n 29). 
35 See Bianchi (n 29). 
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One issues might be that legal scholarship lacks catch-all categories for actors, unlike, for example, in 
political economy. In political economy, ͚actors͛ comprise state actors, international organisations, 
club forums e.g. G 7, 8 and 20, market actors, Non-Governmental Organisations and significantly, the 
catch-all category of ͚eǀeƌǇdaǇ aĐtoƌs͛.36 As a science, it is a curious one because these 
categorisations are dependent upon which of them receives the most attention.  Instead, we might 
argue that legal scholarship is much more matter of fact.  International law traditionally recognises 
only a small number of entities capable of possessing international rights or duties and of bring 
international claims because its primary subjects have always been States. Other traditional subjects 
of international law are insurgents or sui generis entities e.g. the Holy See, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. International organisations with international legal personality have 
followed thereafter, more prominently the UN and the number of international organisations has 
risen substantially over time- from the IMF, the Word Bank Group, and the WTO.  
The problem lies in that international rules are shaped increasingly by actors beyond the traditional 
subjects of international law e.g. International non-governmental organisations, transnational 
corporations, inter-agency cooperation. Private economic actors and companies have been 
strengthened by the rise of international investment proteĐtioŶs. ͚AĐtoƌs͛ as a doŵaiŶ of studǇ iŶ 
legal scholarship tend to be depicted in esoteric subjects which have distinctive interactions 
between markets, private and public actors. For example, International Economic Law carves up 
actors to comprise States, State enterprises, International organisations, non-institutionalised 
forums of cooperation, international inter-agency cooperation, non-governmental organisations and 
private corporations and standard-setters for transnational cooperation.37 Nevertheless, such 
analyses remain ƌooted iŶ the ͚suďjeĐt͛ paƌadigŵ of puďliĐ iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ. This has aŶ aǁkǁaƌd 
relationship with ͚standard-setting͛ and bottom-up practices or conduct that generates rule-making 
beyond these categories. No matter how vast the categorisation of actors appears, it arguably has a 
static quality to it.  
 
The proliferation or ͚pluralisation͛ of actors are also key concerns of contemporary EU law. Yet there 
no agreed definition of an actor under EU law. 38  Instead, a sharp distinction is drawn there between 
                                                                
36 E.g. A. Broome, Issues and Actors in the Global Political Economy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) Part I 
and Ch. 9. See the diagrammatic structure on pp. 12.  
37 M. Herdegen, Principles of International Economic Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), Chapter 3 
38 See M. Ruffert, Personality under EU Law: a conceptual answer towards the pluralisation of the EU European 
Law Journal (2014) 20(3) European Law Journal, pp. 346-367; M. Ruffert and C. Walteƌ ;eds.Ϳ, ͚Institutionalised 
IŶterŶatioŶal Laǁ͛ (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming, 2015).  
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the masters of the treaties and those amenable to judicial review or those with legal personality.39 
This concern is usually framed around the control of discretion or legality control of the powers of 
burgeoning agencies vis a vis the Commission, the Member States and national authorities. As a 
result of these developments, a permissive approach to the rule-making of the proliferating agencies 
has been recently adopted by the Court of Justice, where it has laid emphasis upon the importance 
of highly structured functionality rather than controls per se, even where extensive institutional 
design has been built up upon thin legal authority. 40  As will be discussed next, the grant of legal 
personality under EU law has been predominantly accorded to entities such as agencies in a wholly 
pragmatic rather than conceptual basis.41 Similarly, the burgeoning use of the term ͚non-state͛ 
actors as a term of art to comprise almost any entity inter alia contesting legitimacy, authority or 
accountability in public international law has followed a similarly pragmatic rather than conceptual 
path.42 Flexibility and pragmatism are dominant and enduring themes in both subjects but do not 
necessarily provide analytical frameworks of any sophistication. 43 Instead they may be said to 
demonstrate the somewhat crudely factual understanding of actors in contemporary legal 
scholarship. However, such a conclusion would appear unduly harsh or quick to judge and reflects 
little upon the question of methodology. This would seem to lead to the question of the method to 
identify actors in EU and International law.  
(ii) Functional and technical identification of actors in EU and International law 
 
The criteria for identifying actors in EU and public international law are dominated by legal 
personality. Methodologically, it plays a highly relativist function. Legal personality is a quality 
granted by certain legal norms and is exclusively recognized in the light of a respective norm. As a 
                                                                
39 See Ruffert, ibid IV, (D). 
40 Eg Case C-270/12 UK v. European Parliament and Council (Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 22 January 
2014), on the basis of Article 114 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
41 It arguably also reflects the under-developed conceptualisation of institutional balance in contemporary EU 
laǁ: J. JaĐƋué, ͚The pƌiŶĐiple of iŶstitutioŶal ďalaŶĐe͛ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ϰϭ;ϮͿ Common Market Law Review pp. 383-391; J. 
MoŶaƌ, ͚The ‘ejeĐtioŶ of the EU-US SWIFT Interim Agreement by the European Parliament : A Historic Vote 
aŶd Its IŵpliĐatioŶs͛ (2010) 15(2) European Foreign Affairs Review pp. 143-ϭϱϭ; P. Cƌaig ͚IŶstitutioŶs, Poǁeƌ 
aŶd IŶstitutioŶal BalaŶĐe͛ iŶ P. Cƌaig aŶd G. BúƌĐa ;edsͿ The Evolution of EU law  (Oxford: OUP, 2011) pp. 41-84; 
‘. Dehousse, ͚Misfits: EU Laǁ aŶd the TƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ of EuƌopeaŶ GoǀeƌŶaŶĐe͛ iŶ C. Joeƌges aŶd ‘. Dehousse, 
Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Market ;Oǆfoƌd: OUP, ϮϬϬϮͿ. B. “ŵuldeƌs aŶd K. Eisele, ͚‘efleĐtioŶs 
on the IŶstitutioŶal BalaŶĐe, the CoŵŵuŶitǇ Method aŶd the IŶteƌplaǇ ďetǁeeŶ JuƌisdiĐtioŶs afteƌ LisďoŶ͛ 
(2012) College of Europe, European Legal Studies, 04 Research Papers in Law  accessed 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/39285/1/researchpaper_4_2012_smulderseisele_final.pdf>; G. CoŶǁaǇ, ͚‘eĐoǀeƌiŶg a 
“epaƌatioŶ of Poǁeƌs iŶ the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ϭϳ European Law Journal pp. 304-322;  J. Ziller, 
͚“epaƌatioŶ of Poǁeƌs iŶ the Euƌopean Union's Intertwined System of Government - A Treaty Based Analysis 
foƌ the Use of PolitiĐal “ĐieŶtists aŶd CoŶstitutioŶal LaǁǇeƌs͛ ;ϮϬϬϴͿ ϳϯ Il Politico pp. 133-179. 
42 See above, n 34.   
43 The rise of pragmatism is further evident in recent debates on the possible decline of formal treaties as a 
mechanism for cooperation in international law. 
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result, legal personality is frequently ͚side-lined͛ as a highly technical, doctrinal or functional issue. 
Personality in the EU legal order often appears to be granted less on a conceptually reflected basis 
and rather for pragmatic reasons, thereby enabling entities to perform legal activities.44 Thus, it is a 
͚doeƌs͛ ǀisioŶ of fuŶĐtioŶalitǇ, ƌatheƌ thaŶ a ͚thiŶkeƌs͛ oŶe. For example, while all 35 regulatory 
agencies of the EU have legal personality and independence,45 many non-independent executive 
agencies established to perform programmes on behalf of the European Commission also have legal 
personality.46 Some agencies have explicit clauses granting powers of legal supervision to the 
Commission, others not but such distinctions are not necessarily perceived to have any significance.  
And if personality is ͚granted͛ by public international law, this signifies recognition of an entity in the 
international sphere and direct submission of the entity under the principles and rules of public 
international law.47 Public international law differentiates sharply between entities vested with 
personality and institutions acting on behalf of these entities. For example, the United Nations bear 
                                                                
44 Ruffert, (n 38) pp. 350; M. CƌeŵoŶa, ͚The EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ as aŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal aĐtoƌ: the issues of flexibility 
and linkage͛, (1998) 3(1) European Foreign Affairs Review pp. 67-94, R. Leal-AƌĐas, ͚EU Legal PeƌsoŶalitǇ iŶ 
Foreign Policy?͛ (2006) 24(2) Boston University International Law Journal, pp. 165-ϮϭϮ; ‘. Wessell, ͚‘eǀisiŶg the 
international legal status of the EU͛ (2000) 5(4) European Foreign Affairs Review, pp. 507-537. P. Caldwell, EU 
External Relations Law and Policy in the Post Lisbon era (The Hague: T M C Asser Press, 2012). Cf The 
ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe oŶ ͚The CategoƌǇ of the PeƌsoŶ iŶ EU Laǁ͛ EUI/ University Paris 1 in 2014, focussing upon the 
protection of the person as the chief asset and interest of EU law, reflecting its shift from agency to identity, as 
well as the prominence of justice. 
45 Ruffert n 38, pp. 349; E. Chiti, ͚An Important Part of the EU͛s IŶstitutioŶal MaĐhiŶeƌǇ: Featuƌes, Pƌoďleŵs aŶd 
Perspectives of European Agencies͛ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review pp. 1395 - 1442; S. Griller and A. 
Orator, ͚EǀeƌǇthiŶg UŶdeƌ CoŶtƌol? The ͞WaǇ Foƌǁaƌd͟ foƌ EuƌopeaŶ AgeŶĐies iŶ the Footsteps of the Meroni 
Doctrine͛ (2010) 35 European Law Review pp. 3 – 35; M. Busuioc, European Agencies: Law and Practices of 
Accountability (Oxford: OUP, 2013).   
46 Article 4(2) Council Regulation (EC) No. 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive 
agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes. 
47 J. NijŵaŶ, ͚The Concept of International Legal Personality - An Inquiry into the History and Theory of 
IŶterŶatioŶal Laǁ͛ (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004); D. Akande, ͚International Organizations͛ in M. Evans 
(eds.), International Law (Oxford: OUP, 3rd edn, 2010); J. Klaďďeƌs, ͚Pƌesuŵptiǀe PeƌsoŶalitǇ: the EuƌopeaŶ 
UŶioŶ iŶ IŶteƌŶatioŶal Laǁ͛, iŶ M. KoskeŶŶieŵi ;eds.Ϳ, International Law Aspects of the European Union (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1998) at 231; C. Brölmann, The institutional veil in public international law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007); G. Weissberg, The IŶterŶatioŶal Legal PersoŶalitǇ of the UŶited NatioŶs͛ (Columbia: 
Columbia University, 1959Ϳ; C. JeŶks, ͚The Legal PeƌsoŶalitǇ of IŶteƌŶatioŶal OƌgaŶisatioŶs͛ (1945) 22 British 
Yearbook of International Law 267, at 270; M. Rama-MoŶtaldo, ͚IŶteƌŶatioŶal Legal PeƌsoŶalitǇ aŶd Iŵplied 
Powers of International Organizations (1970) 44 British Yearbook of International Law pp. 111-155; A. Reinisch, 
͚“eĐuƌiŶg the AĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ of IŶteƌŶatioŶal Organizations͛ (2001) 7(2) Global Governance pp. 131-149; I. 
Seidl-HoheŶǀeldeƌŶ, ͚The Legal PeƌsoŶalitǇ of IŶteƌŶatioŶal aŶd “upƌaŶatioŶal OƌgaŶisatioŶs͛ (1965) 21 Rev 
Egyptienne Droit Int pp. 35-ϳϮ; F. “eǇeƌsted, ͚IŶteƌŶatioŶal PeƌsoŶalitǇ of IŶteƌgoǀeƌŶŵeŶtal OƌgaŶizatioŶs: do 
theiƌ ĐapaĐities ƌeallǇ depeŶd oŶ theiƌ ĐoŶstitutioŶs͛ (1964) 4 Indian Journal of International Law pp 1-74; J. 
D͛AspƌeŵoŶt, ͚Abuse of the Legal Personality of International Organizations and the Responsibility of Member 
“tates͛ (2007) 4 International Organizations Law Review pp. 91-ϭϭϵ; H. AufƌiĐht, ͚PeƌsoŶalitǇ iŶ IŶteƌŶatioŶal 
Laǁ͛ ;ϭϵϰϯͿ ϯϳ American Political Science Review, pp 217-243; D. Bethleheŵ, ͚The eŶd of geogƌaphǇ: the 
ĐhaŶgiŶg Ŷatuƌe of iŶteƌŶatioŶal sǇsteŵ aŶd the ĐhalleŶge to iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ Ϯϱ;ϭͿ European Journal 
of International Law pp 9-Ϯϰ; J. Klaďďeƌs, ͚The ĐoŶĐept of legal peƌsoŶalitǇ͛, (2005) Ius Gentium, Journal of the 
University of Baltimore, pp 35-ϲϲ; M. “elleƌs, ͚Legal peƌsoŶalitǇ: IŶteƌŶatioŶal legal peƌsoŶalitǇ͛, ;ϮϬϬϱͿ ϭϭ Ius 
Gentium, Journal of the University of Baltimore, pp 67-78. 
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personality while the Security Council and General Assembly do not. Yet while the international legal 
capacity of the IMF is not disputed, there is dispute concerning the form of agreements that it enters 
with Member States.48 And although theƌe ŵaǇ ďe a ͚ŶotioŶ͛ of peƌsoŶalitǇ uŶdeƌ puďliĐ 
international law or national private law, there is no concept of a legal person under EU law.49 More 
practically, the EU does not become legally subdivided by institutions such as the European Central 
Bank or European Investment Bank and instead they gain such powers as functional or practical 
means to allow them to become active in the international field, indicating the dominance of 
pragmatism. The redundancy of legal personality as a functional tool might be emphasised by 
contemporary EU law. Many new actors created in recent times are not technical actors for 
example, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) or the 
European Public Prosecutors Office (EPPO).50 Instead, they are carved up in other ways, for example, 
iŶ the Đase of the ECϯ as ͚desks͛ of otheƌ iŶstitutioŶs, i.e. of the eǀolǀiŶg eŶtitǇ, Euƌopol. As pƌaĐtiĐe 
demonstrates, this does not preclude their autonomous development as actors who litigate or can 
be subject to judicial review. Arguably, such developments serve to underscore the unhelpful limits 
of doctrinalism and legal formalism, lacking realism about autonomy and institutional behaviour.   
(iii) The ͚whole͛ aŶd the suŵ of the parts: speaking about institutional components of 
international organisations as actors in rule-making  
 
One means to look beyond legal and doctrinal formalism might be to gauge how we have evolved 
our understanding of the measurement of entities qua institutions. In this respect, pragmatism 
remains a challenge to the measurement of institutions, as much as the malleability of language. For 
example, consider those who have argued that each piece of international law should be studied as 
aŶ iŶstitutioŶ itself, suĐh that the set of iŶstitutioŶs Đoŵpƌises a ͚ĐoŶtiŶeŶt͛.51 International and EU 
law have proven themselves both to be flexible and pragmatic projects and yet risk much analytical 
clarity through the dominance of this pragmatism.52 We may observe how legal theory specifically 
adopts a highly internal analytical perspective that renders its evolution more challenging. So this 
raises the question as to the usefulness and workability of external perspectives.  
                                                                
48 E. Denters, Law and policy of IMF Conditionality (1996) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), at 306. 
N. Wahi, ͚Human Rights Accountability of the IMF and the World Bank: A Critique of Existing Mechanisms and 
Articulation of a Theory of Horizontal Accountability͛ (2005-2006) 12 U. C. Daǀis J. IŶt͛l L. & Pol͛Ǉ at 344. J. 
Jackson, T. Cottier, J. Jackson and R. Lastra (eds.), International Law in Financial Regulation and Monetary 
Affairs (Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
49 Ruffert, (n 38). 
50 See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office 
COM/2013/0534 final; https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3. See n 30.  
51 See Koremenos, (n 17). 
52 See Bianchi, (n 29). 
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Foƌŵalist uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of those ǁho aƌe ͚actors͛ eŶgaged iŶ ƌule-making are unable to capture 
much about EU law-making with many new manifestations of ͚eǆeĐutiǀe͛ aĐtoƌs afteƌ the “tate, 
powerful and independent judicial components or the rise of transnational parliamentarianism, 
broadly understood as actors engaged in rule-making after the State. To be sure, some may act with 
considerably more institutional, social or political legitimacy than others. We may say that formalist 
criteria and theorisations operate to exclude the acts or practices of institutional entities or 
components that are part of international organisations who exercise public authority beyond the 
State, who are not regarded as unitary actors or equivalent to the organisation itself. Yet how do 
they in reality interact with private associations, unions or certain experts? What is their zone of 
influence? How do we assess the autonomy of these component parts?  
The rise of transnational parliamentarianism - such as in the Transatlantic Legislatures Dialogues 
(TLD),53 the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) or the Arctic Council assemblies- through 
embryonically formalised contacts and then rule-making initiatives, may indicate ͚living͛ practices of 
aĐtoƌŶess. “iŵilaƌlǇ, ͚ageŶĐifiĐatioŶ͛ iŶ ƌegioŶal, ŶatioŶal aŶd iŶteƌŶatioŶal legal oƌdeƌs- empowering 
many independent actors and according them legal personality with increasingly less checks- might 
lead us to draw similar deductions. Yet are they appropriately excluded from actorness as a result? 
Lexicon has provided with relative flexibility and creativity which notably has not availed of 
actorness in its evolution. For instance, new entities laďelled as ͚Ƌuasi-autoŶoŵous͛ aĐtoƌs uŶdeƌ EU 
law have generated a new lexicon of accountability in EU law and governance.54 It suggests a 
flexibility through law which is absent in actorness theorisations.  
Courts are largely omitted from theorisations of actorness, even courts that are globally and/ or 
empirically acknowledged to be powerful, independent bodies engaging in rule-making practices, 
directly or indirectly.55  It raises the question as to when do courts act as actors in transnational rule-
making, formally and informally and/ or directly and indirectly inside and outside the courtroom? 
How are practices of judicial institutions changing? Are courts overlooked as actors outside their 
courtrooms, for example, their formal interventions in legislative processes? How does (such) 
actorness impact upon adjudication of such rules, as regards accountability? Do such questions 
detract from the usefulness of actorness oƌ siŵplǇ iŶdiĐate its ͚distaŶĐe͛ fƌoŵ legal theoƌǇ? 
One such means to look beyond challenges posed by formalism is to consider understandings of 
actors and structural power, which is considered here next.  
                                                                
53 See JaŶčić (n 24). 
54 See the account of M. Bovens, ͚Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework͛ (2007) 
13(4) European Law Journal pp. 447–468. 
55 See in particular the work of Kelemen, (n 24); Alter, (n 19) 
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III. Looking through and beyond law in conceptualisating actors in rule-making 
 
In non-legal sĐholaƌship oŶ the studǇ ƌegioŶs aŶd oƌgaŶisatioŶs, the pheŶoŵeŶa of ͚actorness͛ 
embraces less readily evolving organisations or their institutional components, even when they 
obtain legal personality or legal authority to act, for example, the EU or ASEAN.56 The criteria remain 
much disputed and in flux but paradoxically retain much significance across subject fields.57 The 
conceptualisation of actorness capacity provides that four distinct dimensions be studied:- authority, 
autonomy, external recognition and internal cohesiveness.58 Yet the peƌspeĐtiǀe of the ͚poseƌ͛ of the 
question is significant, if we may term it this way. Is actorness actively ever sought-after by either 
fledging or components of international organisations? Or both? Do events in the Crimea indicate to 
us that the external perspective, i.e. of recognition, remains the most dominant component for 
lawyers? Adopting a more internal perspective, however, we may observe that practices as to 
actorness could have a dramatic impact upon an international organisation vis a vis its constituent 
iŶstitutioŶal ĐoŵpoŶeŶts. But ǁould this ďe a ŵoƌe ͚ǀalid͛ aŶalǇtiĐal fƌaŵe? 
The Đƌiteƌia of ͚aĐtoƌŶess͛ iŶ ŶoŶ-legal scholarship often include inter alia the de facto or de jure 
recognition of its actions, the legal authority to act, its institutional autonomy or distinctiveness and 
the cohesion between its constituent parts in the formulation of policy.59 Each of the criteria has a 
distinctive and formal legal component: for example, external recognition, de facto and de jure, 
external delegation of competences, institutional independence and competence-derived cohesion. 
If legal sĐholaƌship is laƌgelǇ ͚fiǆated͛ upoŶ foƌŵalist Đƌiteƌia of legal peƌsoŶalitǇ oƌ legal authority to 
act, we might usefully consider whether non-legal scholarship may also be said to reify such criteria. 
There are descriptive and normative components to actorness that may appear to sit together 
uneasily from a legal perspective. For example, do the criteria logically and analytically flow from 
one another? Who is to judge the criteria? Which of them is most legally, socially or politically 
authoritative? It raises many other challenging questions for legal scholarship:- for example, how do 
actorness practices impact upon rule-making itself? How has or should legal scholarship responded 
                                                                
56 M. Cremona, ͚The European Union as a global actor: Roles, models and identity͛ (2004) 41 Common Market 
Law Review pp. 553-573; U. Wunderlich, ͚The EU an Actor Sui Generis? A Comparison of EU and ASEAN 
Actorness͛ (2012) 50(4) Journal of Common Market Studies pp. 653-669; T. Forsberg, ͚Normative Power 
Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type͛ (2011) 49(6) Journal of Common Market Studies 
pp. 1183–1204. 
57 E. Conceicao-Heldt and S. Meunier (eds.), ͚Speaking with a Single Voice: Internal Cohesiveness and External 
Cohesiveness of the EU in World Politics͛ (2014) 21(7) Journal of European Public Policy pp. 961-979. 
58 See J. Jupille and Caporaso, (n 26) 
59 C. Bretherton and J. Vogler (eds.), ͚The European Union as a Sustainable Development Actor: the Case of 
External Fisheries Policy͛ (2008) 30(3) Journal of European Integration pp. 401-ϰϭϳ; C. Geďhaƌd, ͚CoheƌeŶĐe͛ 
(2011) in C. Hill, M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed. 2011), 
pp. 101-127. 
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to the evolution of actorness?  And how does and should the attribution of legal personality of an 
organisation strengthen its actorness vis a vis its institutions and other components? It also raises 
the issue as to whether there a distinction between de facto and de jure actorness? If so, is it 
pragmatic or valid? How to the actors advance the components of actorness through law? And how 
flexible is actorness? How does and should actorness influence theorisations of legitimacy and 
accountability?  
The conventional conceptualisation of the actorness qualities of international organisations only 
embrace formal international organisations, and less so fledgling or new supranational organisations 
or their institutional components, however powerful. As a result, the conventional criteria for 
actorness are innately challenged by transnational rule-making practices. For example, evolving 
international organisations such as ASEAN or the EU bedevil characterisation in non-legal 
scholarship, even after the recent acquisition of legal personality by the latter and the adoption of 
settled practices of representation in the former. 60 It also poses the question perhaps as to whether 
a laĐk of geŶeƌal agƌeeŵeŶt oŶ the aĐtoƌŶess of aŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ ŵaǇ ďe said to ďe ͚eǆploited͛ ďǇ the 
oƌgaŶisatioŶ itself oƌ its ĐoŵpoŶeŶts. IŶ this ƌegaƌd, oŶe Đould take as aŶ eǆaŵple the EU͛s faƌ-
reaching efforts to legislate in environmental matters, with implications outside of its territory.61 Or 
siŵilaƌlǇ, oŶe Đould ĐoŶsideƌ the iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ͚teŶse͛ ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of teƌƌitoƌǇ iŶ EU ƌegulatioŶ of 
financial services.62 Understandably, then, there is a movemeŶt to ƌeĐoŶsideƌ ǁhǇ ͚aĐtoƌŶess͛ must 
evolve. And such a movement takes as its starting point frequently the exceptionalism of the EU as a 
casestudy as a means to reconsider the content of actorness, one which legal scholarship may derive 
much benefit from engaging with.63 Hoǁeǀeƌ, oŶe ƌisks easilǇ aŶ ͚EU-ĐeŶtƌiĐ͛ theoƌisatioŶ.  
Moƌeoǀeƌ, ͚foƌŵal͛ aĐtoƌŶess Đƌiteƌia aƌe paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ͚afteƌ the faĐt͛ aŶd do Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ eǆplaiŶ 
how actorness emerges nor how it interacts with other institutions presently or in the future- or 
even generates other actorness fact matrixes.64 In this regard, actorness has a very formalistic and 
descriptive character that can appear rigid and unhelpful.  The enhanced international actorness of 
                                                                
60 U. WuŶdeƌliĐh, ͚The EU aŶ AĐtoƌ “ui GeŶeƌis? A CoŵpaƌisoŶ of EU aŶd A“EAN AĐtoƌŶess͛ (2012) 50(4) 
Journal of Common Market Studies pp. 653-669. 
61 The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), accessed 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm>; D. Ellerman and B. Buchner (eds.), ͚The EuƌopeaŶ 
UŶioŶ EŵissioŶs TƌadiŶg “Đheŵe: OƌigiŶs, AlloĐatioŶ, aŶd EaƌlǇ ‘esults͛ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ϭ;ϭͿ Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy pp. 66-87. 
62 E.g. J. “Đott, ͚EǆtƌateƌƌitoƌialitǇ aŶd Teƌƌitoƌial EǆteŶsioŶ iŶ EU Laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ϲϮ;ϭͿ American Journal of 
Comparative Law pp. 87-126. 
63 K. Čŵakaloǀá aŶd J. ‘oleŶĐ, ͚The DiŵeŶsioŶs of EU͛s AĐtoƌŶess: IŶteƌŶal LegitiŵaĐǇ͛ iŶ Petƌ KƌatoĐhǀíl, The 
EU as a Political Actor – The AŶalǇsis of Four DiŵeŶsioŶs of the EU͛s AĐtorŶess (Berlin: Nomos, 2013) pp. 47-58. 
64 M. Groenleer and L. Van “Đhaik, ͚UŶited We “taŶd? The European Union's International Actorness in the 
Cases of the IŶteƌŶatioŶal CƌiŵiŶal Couƌt aŶd the KǇoto PƌotoĐol͛ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ϰϱ(5) Journal of Common Market 
Studies pp. 969-998. 
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an actor such as the EU may enable it to act as a central player in the creation of new international 
ďodies, foƌ eǆaŵple, the IŶteƌŶatioŶal CƌiŵiŶal Couƌt. “uĐh ͚suďseƋueŶtlǇ-eŶaĐted͛ eŶtities ŵaǇ, as 
this example might demonstrate, engender much critique as to legitimacy in the form of social 
acceptance as much as authority. Yet does actorness offer any real window of insight as to such 
developments? Or into the specific legitimacy (and also authority) questions that these 
developments provoke?  
Actorness may not yet provide a suitably reliable framework for legal scholarship but it is argued to 
offer an important example of disciplinary reflection as to the contours of rule-making. This 
publication seeks to look more broadly at conceptualisations of actors and rule-making, even beyond 
the subject areas of EU and Public International law, particularly leading casestudies of transnational 
law or of international relations, so as to identify common themes and possible alternative means to 
reflect upon the conceptualisation of actors beyond flexibility and pragmatism. Part of the challenge 
of evaluating how we understand actors in rule-making is the nature of the action itself i.e. how it 
occurs matters. The next section thus considers the relevance of behavioural and sociological 
understandings of postnational rule-making in the subjects of EU and Public International Law. 
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 (IV) The behavioural dimension of postnational rule-making 
(i) Zooming in upon acting in the shadows 
Institutional components of organisations may manage to engage in rule-making practices through 
inter alia influence, independence, autonomy, contestation and an active development of their 
functions and roles. However, the nature of such rule-making may be said to occur ͚in the shadow͛ 
of other institutions or bodies within organisations, who are formal actors, eluding thus a more 
doctrinal debate.  It remains ͚in the shadow͛ in so far as it may occur as part of a larger organisation 
or structure where it may have many informal influences, lack formal power structures, may operate 
with a grey-zone of autonomy or independence or may even be subject to multiple influences 
beyond other institutions.65 For example, much emphasis in EU rule-making has been placed on 
regulating ex ante participation of stakeholders without formally regulation of lobbyists- and thereby 
ŵakes distiŶĐt ĐhoiĐes ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg the peŶuŵďƌa of ͚legalitǇ͛. The temporal choices exercises in our 
study of zones of rule-making can sǁiftlǇ eǆĐlude the ͚shadoǁs͛. The leǆiĐoŶ of ͚foƌegƌouŶd͛ aŶd 
͚ďaĐkgƌouŶd͛ aĐtoƌs has ďeeŶ ĐeŶtƌal to mapping the theoƌisatioŶ of the EU͛s Đoŵposite eǆeĐutiǀe, 
as ŵuĐh as ͚high leǀel͛ aŶd ͚loǁ leǀel͛ functionality thereof.66 In this regard, spatial zones of rule-
making can be shrouded in their own malleable lexicon- but paradoxically, also elucidated, often 
sharply, in this manner. 
 
Theƌe aƌe ŶotaďlǇ ǀeƌǇ feǁ ͚dediĐated͛ oƌ ͚aĐtual͛ inter-institutional bodies in the EU, save, for 
example, European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) or the Publications Office. Such entities range 
in task from the technical, the functional to the wholly administrative. The evolution of inter-
institutional agƌeeŵeŶts iŶ EU laǁ aƌe ĐoŶsideƌed as a ͚ĐoŶstitutioŶalisatioŶ͛ pƌoĐess ďǇ laǁǇeƌs and 
political scientists alike.67 TheǇ aƌe eǀeŶ theoƌised as aĐtioŶ fƌoŵ ͚ďeloǁ͛, whereby the institutions 
themselves have been empowered and autonomously steered the evolution of practice.68 Current 
debates concern their actual opacity or transparency, given their tendency to evolve into hard law. 
Yet ǁhǇ should iŶstitutioŶal aĐtioŶ fƌoŵ ͚ǁithiŶ͛ aŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ ďe ĐoŶsideƌed as ďeiŶg ͚from 
ďeloǁ͛?  What does it indicate about our understanding of zones of action between legal orders? 
                                                                
65See Biermann and Siebenhüner, (n 32); Chalmers, (n 3); Lescano and Teubner, (n 4); D. Curtin and I. Dekker 
͚The EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ fƌoŵ MaastƌiĐht to LisďoŶ: iŶstitutioŶal aŶd legal uŶitǇ out of the shadoǁs͛ iŶ P. Cƌaig 
and G. Búrca (eds.), The evolution of EU law (Oxford: OUP 2nd edn, 2011), pp. 155-186. 
66 Curtin and Dekker, (n 65); Curtin, (n 2). 
67See Curtin, (n 2); A. Heritier and D. Kerwer et al (eds.), Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on 
National Policymaking (United States: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). See their place in the political guidelines of 
the Juncker Commission, accessed <http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf>.  
68 E.g., B. Driessen, Interinstitutional Conventions in EU Law (London: Cameron May, 2007).  
                                                               
17 
 
This raises the question as to the appropriate normative frame through which to understand EU 
action.  
(ii) The centrality of social legitimacy for postnational rule-making 
 
In sociological terms, legitimacy may be an objective fact but it is socially constructed.69  Legitimacy 
in this context means social credibility and acceptance. Of course, legitimacy may be pragmatic or 
normatively or cognitively based.70 It is not necessarily a study of legal formalism or legal validity, a 
study which some suggest could be even irrelevant or unproductive. Legitimacy can differ across 
time and space and between actors, systems and contexts and is characterised by malleability but 
also much semantic ambiguity.  The concept of legitimacy has been argued to have been long 
neglected in public international law until more recently.71 The three ͚doŵiŶaŶt͛ theoretical 
categorisations or taxonomies of legitimacy, of legal, moral and social legitimacy are not always 
regarded as self-contained.72 There remain important distinctions to be drawn between normative 
and sociological legitimacy, between normative and empirical legitimacy, between de jure and de 
facto legitimacy and between moral and descriptive legitimacy, and perhaps also formal legitimacy.73 
Functional categorisations are argued to have driven the significance of mixed approaches. 
Legitimacy may change but may also be resilient. Legitimacy communications can ͚forgive͛ individual 
transgressions.74 There is a particular in scholarship a tendency to focus upon normative or cognitive 
bases of legitimacy rather than on whether it is regarded as legitimate.75 And while the questions are 
analytically distinct, each may have a normative or cognitive basis, for example, legitimacy that is so 
deeply rooted as to be beyond question.76 Social legitimacy is defined as its projection on to an 
                                                                
69 W. Scott, Institutions and Organizations – Ideas, Interests and Identities (Sage: SAGE Publications, 2001). 
70 See Thomas on the usefulness of distinguishing between the concept of legitimacy and legitimation, citing A. 
Appelbaum, ͚Legitimacy in a Bastard Kingdom͛ (2004) John F Kennedy School of Government Centre for Public 
Leadership Working Paper, Spring 2004, pp. 74-94, accessed <http://dspace.mit.edu/handles/1721.1/55927> ;  
J. Weiler, Europe in Crisis – OŶ ͚PolitiĐal MessiaŶisŵ͛, ͚LegitiŵaĐǇ͛ aŶd the ͚‘ule of Laǁ͛ (2012) Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies pp. 248-269. 
71 Cf . Thoŵas ͚The Uses aŶd Aďuses of LegitiŵaĐǇ iŶ IŶteƌŶatioŶal Laǁ͛ (2014) 34(4) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies pp. 729-758, to the effect that it is easier to make things legal than to make them legitimate. 
72 Ibid, 744; see T. Franck The Power Of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: OUP, 1990) 
73 C. Thornhill and S. Ashenden (eds.), Legality and Legitimacy: normative and Sociological Approaches (Berlin: 
Nomos, 2010); A. Buchanan and R. Keohane (eds.), The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions in Rudiger 
R. Wolfrum and V. Roben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (United States: Springer, 2008); F. Scharpf, 
Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy (2003) Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Working Paper 
07/03 pp. 10-16. 
74 J. Gibson and G. Caldeira, ͚The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union: Models of 
Institutional Support͛ (1995) 89(2) The American Political Science Review pp. 356-376. 
75 J. Black, ͚Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes͛ 
(2008) 2 Regulation and Governance pp. 137-164.  
76 For example, challenging the validity of legislation that is in force for some time and around which 
considerable enforcement regimes are built: data retention.  
                                                               
18 
 
action, rule, actor or system by an aĐtoƌ͛s belief that the action, rule, actor or system is morally or 
legally legitimate. It is argued that unlike legal or moral legitimacy, social legitimacy does not make a 
normative commitment to any relationship of power, it drops any sense of an objective ought. On 
the basis that social legitimacy is an empty concept without an account of the moral or legal 
fƌaŵeǁoƌk to ǁhiĐh the ͚ďelieǀeƌ suďsĐƌiďes͛, soĐial legitiŵaĐǇ is aŶ eŵpiƌiĐal ĐoŶĐept ďut it oŶe 
which is concerned specifically with what forms of power people believe morally or legally justified.77 
Weberian legitimacy has historically been strongly tied to the analysis of legal structures.78 
 
We may easily overlook the social dimensions and sigŶifiĐaŶĐe of ͚acting in the shadows͛ foƌ ƌule-
making and our understanding of who are actors engaging in rule-making.  It is argued here thus that 
an analysis of actors in postnational rule-making benefits most obviously - and even realistically- 
from a social understanding of legitimacy. To opeŶ up the ͚ďlaĐk ďoǆ͛ of the shadoǁs to daǇlight 
enables us to address further questions such as the acceptance of the practices of post-national rule-
making, i.e. the social legitimacy thereof.79 Given the dominance pragmatism as an explanation of 
the evolution of the EU and International legal orders, acceptance appears as a reasonable tool to 
measure contemporary practices.  The social legitimacy of actors in rule-making may have a differing 
resonance in in alternate areas of law such that it becomes even more challenging to transpose this 
to the transnational context. Take, for example, the greater social ͚acceptance͛ and understanding of 
the work of lobbyists in rule-making in the US rather than in the EU.80 However, theorisations unduly 
reliant upon sociological and/ or behavioural analysis risks over-expanding the malleability of 
vocabulary at the expense of analytical sharpness. It is all too easy to become emasculated in the 
malleability of words in the depiction of behaviour. What this publication makes a case for is the 
                                                                
77 See supra, Thomas (n 71), 741. 
78 M. Weber and E. Fischoff (tr.), Economy and Society: An outline of Interpretive Sociology in G. Roth and C. 
Wittich eds., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 215 
79 E. Cohn and S. White (eds.), Legal Socialization: A Study of Norms and Rules (United States: Springer-Verlag, 
1990); E. Cohn et al, ͚An integrated model of legal and moral reasoning and rule-violating behaviour: The role 
of legal attitudes͛ (2010) 34(4) Law and Human Behaviour pp. 295-309. 
80 M. Coǁles, ͚The TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ BusiŶess Dialogue aŶd DoŵestiĐ BusiŶess-Government RelatioŶs͛ iŶ M. 
Cowles, J. Caparaso and T. Risse (eds.), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Cornell: 
Cornell University Press, 2001) pp. 159-179; J. Thuƌďeƌ, P. GƌiffiŶ aŶd M. EgaŶ, ͚CoŶfeƌeŶĐe oŶ LoďďǇiŶg, EthiĐs 
‘efoƌŵ iŶ U.“. aŶd E.U.͛ Aŵeƌican University, 17 March 2014 accessed < 
http://www.american.edu/spa/news/lobbying-conference-2014.cfm>. Contrast the scrutiny on all actors 
involved in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, which currently includes 
videoing all stakeholders meetings, registering participation, tweeting all details of meetings and negotiations 
and feeding the public and civil society regularly with copious amounts of information; accessed  
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/>  The suďstaŶtiǀe aŶd pƌoĐeduƌal ͚aĐĐeptaŶĐe͛ of this 
transparency on either side of the Atlantic seems highly divergent; see A. Bunea, ͚Issues, preferences and ties: 
deteƌŵiŶaŶts of iŶteƌest gƌoups͛ pƌefeƌeŶce attainment in the EU environmental policy͛ (2013) 20(4) Journal of 
European Public Policy pp. 552-570.  
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relevance of social legitimacy for our understanding of actors in rule-making from the perspective of 
EU and public international law. The publication also draws attention and focus to new sources and 
autonomous actors engaging in rule-making, falling outside standard definitions thereof.  Many 
chapters of this publication focus upon new actors and practices of behaviour arising  
This ties in with a movement in scholarship to reconstruct methodology and take into account the 
multi-disciplinarity of post-national rule-making, its highly diverse range of actors, instruments and 
processes.81 It advocates approaches which accommodate inter alia the plurality of sources of EU 
law and which explicitly enunciate its method. There is a significant demand for attention to new 
methodologies in the direction of EU law, so as to move beyond doctrinal outcomes and 
understandings. The methodological focus required to pinpoint the actions of a new or 
underexplored actors e.g. the academy, or the less than regulated (lobbyists) simply mapping a new 
phenomenon (e.g. transnational parliaments) is thus done here through the use of inductive 
accounts.  
Accordingly, this publication seeks to focus upon many of the individual components of institutional 
organisations, as well as other actors within rule-making structures that may be readily overlooked 
by formalism and doctrinalism, such as lobbyists and academia. The publication aims to capture new 
pƌaĐtiĐes aŶd theŵes aŶd ƌefleĐts upoŶ the teŶsioŶs that theǇ pose foƌ old ͚leŶses͛ by drawing  
together scholars, senior and junior of EU law, Public international Law, International relations, the 
doctrinal and non-conventional studies, those focussed upon Asia and South America as much as the 
EU. 
(IV) Overview of the thematic sections and individual chapters͛  
 
By way of a background and then overview to the contributions to the publication, readers might 
find it useful to know that contributors to Section I on ͚Framing Actors in Postnational Rule-making: 
between Doctrine and Lexicon͛ were asked to reflect upon the following general themes or questions 
insofar as this proved relevant and/ or possible for them individually. These included the following 
issues: 
                                                                
81 R. van Gestel, and H-W. MiĐklitz, ͚WhǇ Methods Matteƌ iŶ EuƌopeaŶ Legal “Đholaƌship͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ϮϬ(3) 
European Law Journal 292-316, at 313-ϯϭϲ ;͚AŶ AgeŶda foƌ a EuƌopeaŶ Deďate͛Ϳ; See Vauchez (n. 1); T. Hervey, 
R. Cryer, B. Sokhi-Bulley and A. Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011); R. van Gestel, H-W. Micklitz and M-P. Maduƌo, ͚MethodologǇ iŶ the Neǁ Legal Woƌld,͛ 
European University Institute Law Working Paper 2012/13; U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen and L. Roseberry (eds.), 
European Legal Method (Copenhagen: DJOF Publishing, 2013); see ͚The Neǁ HistoƌǇ of EU laǁ͛ pƌoject, of 
Copenhagen University, accessed http://europeanlaw.saxo.ku.dk/. 
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 How limiting is doctrine or lexicon? Does it accommodate change and flexibility?  How easily are new actors accommodated within postnational rule-making?  How do you understand the postnational? Does it accommodate your subject or 
appear procedural? Limiting?  Do Ǉou fiŶd ͚leǆiĐoŶ͛ useful as a teƌŵ of aƌt?  How do questions of legitimacy, e.g. social legitimacy and social acceptance, impact 
upon how you formulate doctrine and lexicon here? 
Next, CoŶtƌiďutoƌs to “eĐtioŶ II: ͚New Institutional Components and Systems: Establishing Autonomy 
in Postnational Rule-Making͛ ǁeƌe asked to ƌefleĐt upoŶ the folloǁiŶg theŵes or questions: 
 How is autonomy established or practiced by new institutional components? How does 
this autonomy relate to rule-making? Formally, informally etc?   Is it a zero-sum game/ a loss and gain for other institutional components? How easily 
does a new institution(al component) become part of a system?  Is post-national rule-making a help or a hindrance to reflect upon new institutions and 
institutional components? Is it embracing of the sui generis?   Hoǁ do Ǉou uŶdeƌstaŶd ͚sui geŶeƌis͛ ǁithiŶ suĐh ƌuleŵakiŶg?   How do you understand rule-making in this context?   To what extent does a new institution or component seek to operate, function or act in 
the shadows? How evident is such behaviour? Is it covert? Does it raise legitimacy 
questions? Does it raise legitimacy questions more from an internal than an external 
perspective?  
CoŶtƌiďutoƌs to “eĐtioŶ III: ͚Interactions between Actors in Postnational Rule-Making: Framing 
PraĐtiĐes ͚iŶ the Shadoǁs͛ aŶd BeǇoŶd͛ ǁeƌe asked to ĐoŶsideƌ the folloǁiŶg theŵes or questions.  
 What aƌe pƌaĐtiĐes ͚iŶ the shadoǁs͛ of rule-ŵakiŶg?  What ŵakes theŵ ͚shadoǁǇ͛? 
Does your casestudy fall short of this? What could make the practices shadowy? Is 
there illegitimacy, malaise or malpractice arising from non-regulation? Or is it social 
acceptance? By whom? Does postnational rule-ŵakiŶg iŶĐoƌpoƌate ͚shadoǁs͛ oƌ 
such zones of activity outside of our regular lexicon?   What is a site of rule-making? How relevant is social acceptance?   Are there legitimacy questions raised by the formulation of the practices?  Is social acceptance useful to reflect upon?  What makes certain actors interact in rule-making practices?  
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 Is postnational rule-making helpful to frame these practices? Does it embrace them?   Aƌe ͚Ŷeǁ aĐtoƌs͛ the Đhief souƌĐe of ĐoŶĐeƌŶ iŶ Ǉouƌ ĐasestudǇ?  Is your casestudy a new method of iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ŵoƌe thaŶ ͚Ŷeǁ aĐtoƌs͛? Hoǁ do Ǉou 
understand rule-making?   
The fruits of the labours of the contributors are to be found in their individual contributions. 
Nonetheless, their contributions are summarised here briefly next.  
In section 1, on ͚Framing Actors in Postnational Rule-ŵakiŶg: ďetǁeeŶ DoĐtƌiŶe aŶd LeǆiĐoŶ͛, Collins 
identifies the tension of the postnational with formalism iŶ his papeƌ ͚International Law: Mapping 
the TerraiŶ of IŶstitutioŶal ͚Laǁ-MakiŶg͛: Forŵ aŶd FuŶĐtion in International Law͛. He argues that 
that maintaining a limited, formal doctrinal perspective on subjects and sources is not to suggest the 
immutability or centrality of the state, but instead reflects the best approximation of a systemic 
construction of legality in a plural international community. He argues that this is not to suggest a 
fetishism of form over function but rather an interrelation and tension between form and function in 
structuring an understand of the actors of postnational rule-making. 
Ruffert iŶ his pieĐe ͚EuropeaŶ UŶioŶ Laǁ: The MaŶǇ FaĐes of ‘uleŵakiŶg iŶ the EU͛ demonstrates 
that there is a plurality even a plethora of rule-making actors, most of which are active in the 
executive but not the legislative field and tend to work in an informal way within their network. He 
demonstrates that when rule-making is governed by the European Council, these supranational 
institutions remain in the shadows.  
Beyond the subjects of European and International law, Wunderlich reflects on what it means to be 
an actor in international scholarship and considers the concept of actorness and regional actorness 
using the casestudies of EU and ASEAN actorness in a chapteƌ eŶtitled ͚International Relations and 
Gloďal GoǀerŶaŶĐe: AĐtors iŶ Gloďal GoǀerŶaŶĐe IŶstitutioŶs: ASEAN aŶd the EU͛. Is ASEAN really 
emerging as an international actor in its own right or is it minimicking EU actorness by creating a 
hollow mirror image of the EU? He argues that it is often difficult to discern a common rationale 
underlying various EU interregional contacts. EU interregionalism displays a bewildering variety of 
institutional models defying any simple categorisation.  It remains difficult to evaluate regional 
actorness because it is influenced by the EU model. Similarly, focusing upon institutional criteria 
igŶoƌes otheƌ aspeĐts. He ĐautioŶs agaiŶst eǆĐhaŶgiŶg oŶe ͚ďlaĐk ďoǆ͛ foƌ aŶotheƌ. 
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In section II, on ͚New Institutional Components and Systems: Establishing Autonomy in Postnational 
Rule-Making͛, JaŶčić maps both theoretically and practically the phenomenon of transnational 
parliaments beyond the Nation State iŶ ͚Transnational and Global Perspectives: Transnational 
Parliamentarism and Global Governance: The New Practice of Democracy͛.  He reflects upon the 
challenges they pose for rule-making beyond the Nation State given that they are mostly score lowly 
in terms of influence, legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. He outlines in detail 
categorisations of international parliamentary organs (IPOs). Despite their empirical surge, legal and 
political science approaches to the democratisation of global governance pay no more than marginal 
attention to the transnational parliamentary revolution.   He argues that the externalisation of rule-
making beyond the State brings sociological, non-constitutional functions of parliaments to the fore 
De Waele charts the rise of the ŵost staƌk ďut aƌguaďlǇ Đoŵpleǆ aĐtoƌ of the EU͛s eǆeĐutiǀe, that is 
the European Council, to a formal institution of the EU iŶ his Đhapteƌ ͚European Union Law: The 
PraĐtiĐes of the ͚Neǁ͛ EuropeaŶ CouŶĐil͛.  He argues that the European Council is increasingly 
sidestepped under the pretext of the Union method, placing further strains on the institutions 
actorness. Rather it might be assumed too quickly that the new European Council possess a genuine 
actorness.  
 
Urueña focusses upon the dynamics of interaction in postnational rule-making. He argues that actors 
are part of a wider landscape that defines their actorness and are expressions of a changing global 
regulatory space iŶ his Đhapteƌ ͚Interaction as a Site of Post-National Rule Making A case study of the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights͛. He selects the specific dynamics of interaction in a case 
study of Latin American, as to the Inter American Court of Human Rights and domestic constitutional 
courts in the region. Using the regulatory space as a site of law-making he argues that it allows us to 
better appreciate the complex dynamics of post-national rule-making. He argues that actors enter a 
populated regulatory space where they adapt to the other actors of that space as a subtle process of 
adaptation.  Focussing upon events of conflict alone tells us little about the workings of postnational 
rule-making. His focus is a critical one upon the dominance of constitutionalism in the inter-
American mindset and its conception of time and space and even international norms. Instead, the 
global regulatory space is useful to conceptualise change and temporariness in international law 
differently. The interaction approach is premised upon actors interacting in an unknown number of 
interactions.  
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In section III, on ͚Interactions between Actors in Postnational Rule-Making: FramiŶg PƌaĐtiĐes ͚iŶ the 
“hadoǁs͛ aŶd BeǇoŶd͛, Wouters, Odermatt and Chané outline how the EU struggles to become a 
ŵoƌe effeĐtiǀe gloďal aĐtoƌ iŶ theiƌ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ ͚The European Union: A Shadowy Global Actor? The 
UN SǇsteŵ as aŶ Eǆaŵple͛. They depict how the EU can be viewed as a shadowy global actor both in 
light of its limited role and position and through the indirect influences that it exercises in internal 
law and policy making. It examines the case study of the EU within the UN system and its 
relationship to the targets within the Barroso-Ashton Strategy. It considers specific developments as 
to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation as a variety of agencies where the EU has varying 
statuses.  
IŶ heƌ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ eŶtitled ͚European Private Law: Lawmakers in the Shadows: Legal academics in 
the Construction of European Private Law͛, Sefton-Green provides a vivid account of the input of 
academia into rule-making and the place of expertise in the construction of European private Law, 
with multiple actors. She maps the variety of roles that European academics play in the prior stages 
of EU legislation She argues that the official and shadow actors may have political agendas that blow 
the winds in opposite and converging directions, each with a degree of power to influence each 
other in various ways.  
Korkeo-aha considers the place of lobbyists in EU rule-making and their complexity as regards their 
socialisation, their legitimacy and their transparency practices iŶ ͚European Union Law: Lobbyists: 
Rule-makers in the Shadow͛. She argues that lobbyists have become actors of rule-making by 
positioning themselves as either experts or stakeholders. She argues that the analytical challenge is 
our perception of lobbyists in these new roles and their acceptance as actors and draws upon Max 
Weber in offering a typology of a lobbyist, whereby the most pressing legitimacy concerns are raised 
by the practices of the expert lobbyist.  
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